What a new Judaism would entail, part 1

The basic problem driving at the heart of Judaism is secularism. The basic problem driving at its brain is modernity.



Any brand of Judaism, assuming reason to salvage Judaism at all, would have to adress these two issues. The first can be phrased most simply: what is the motivation to practice Judaism (howeverso defined)? This question is apart from the motive to salvage Judaism. If we assume that Judaism is valuable either as means or ends, that does not provide, in itself, motivation for its continuance. Value derived from meaning, as an example, can often come afterwards. Motivation must come, however, first.



This is especially the case for someone who is detached from Judaism. Clearly, for him at least, the issue of motivation is antecedent to that of value. But even for the entrenched Jew, the Jew who already ascribes meaning to Judaism, motivation is more important for his induction into Judaism than value. Even if any supposed value within Judaism is per se false, motivation would be overriding- Perhaps one views Judaism as a didactic fictionalist program. Value, in such a case, is, by definition, absent, but motivation for whatever intended result may still be relevant. A more base example, of course, would be that of the skeptic who will not leave his community in order not to lose his sense of community. There is motivation present, but not meaning.



That said, meaning and motivation are linked. If an action is valuable, there is at least some motivation to perform it. Conversely, if I have a motivation for a particular action, I may impose value upon it; that is to say, rationalize my behaviour.



But value, itself, does not seem like a particularly large problem. As noted, value can be imposed, whereas motivation is, in some sense, primary. Clearly motivation can be reactionary- but reactionary due to what? Due to circumstances addressing particular prior concerns, etc. Value is, in our sense, objective and thus external. Clearly, the value of money is not constructed as an objective fact. However, even though its genesis is subjective (even if community defined) the result is an object to value. Motivation, on the other hand, is never object orientated; it is, rather, a subject based phenomenon. The difference, succinctly, is between impulsion, and compulsion.



Value can be easy to find in Judaism to some, and impossible to others. Those that readily see value will not need a valuation, and those that do not, will likely never be convinced of one. Religion is not an easy topic to parse, especially to the skeptic. Many nowadays are have a naturalized worldview- there is simply no amount of manuervering that one could do to convince them that a supernatural conception is correct. Absent supernatural conception, religion loses its biggest reason to be viewed as valuable- that is, that is metaphysically correct. Convincing someone to value the false is an insourmountable challenge. Arguments for morality will not be convincing in terms of value- the counterexamples one could propose are nothing short of obvious.



Further, value is, in the more fundamental sense, incredibly subjective. Whether a particular metaphysics is correct or not, and whether a particular meta-normative theory is correct or not, people do impose their own values on existence. Objective goals, dreams and hopes are simply not epistemologically reachable. Even if what we value, in some important sense, corresponds or derives from a deep sense of ourselves, this does not make it objective: the particulars are clearly imposed vis a vi our primary desires, such as for food, shelter, etc. The drive for life that creates these needs is not a device that determines value. Rather, it is a motivational device. Our desire to live motivates us to seek the means of living, such as food and shelter. A job, thus, becomes valuable as it meets that which we are already motivated for. This is not to say there is no such object as objective value, rather that our closest possibility is entrenched previously in motivation. Subsequent possibilities seem more clearly nothing more than imposed values.



Lastly, the question of pioneering a new Judaism presupposes value, either in seeking to keep Judaism, or to recreate it afresh. Obviously, this very step should not be taken for granted. However, value of religion in general is a very difficult topic, made more difficult by the imposing the constraints of a particular religion. But, more importantly, this question is part of the second fundamental question I will discuss. As such, I will put it aside for now, though it will certainly impact on the issue of motivation.


Motivation per se say will be discussed in the next post.